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What Is A Tragedy of the Commons?
Overfishing and the Campaign Spending Problem
Shi-Ling Hsu
I. Introduction
Over the thirty-seven years since its publication, Garden 
Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons"1 has clearly become one of the 
most influential writings of all time. The tragedy of the commons is 
one of those rare scholarly ideas that has had an enormous impact in 
academia2 and is also commonly used outside of academia.3 In legal 
scholarship, the tragedy of the commons has been used to characterize 
a scarcity of intellectual property rights,4 telemarketing,5 asbestos 
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1. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
2. A Westlaw search on November 22, 2004, yielded 919 hits for "'The 
Tragedy of the Commons,' /s Hardin". A search of the social sciences citation index 
on the same day produced 2,890 hits. Among the hundreds of books treating the 
concept in depth are: ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990); CAROL 
M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION (1996); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FUTURE OF 
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); COMMONS 
WITHOUT TRAGEDY: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT FROM OVERPOPULATION 
(Robert V. Andelson, ed., 1991).
3. A Google search on January 17, 2005 for "tragedy of the commons" yielded 
over 468,000 matches. A January 17, 2005 Westlaw search of the U.S. 
Congressional Testimony database yielded 32 hits, while a search of the 
Congressional Record database turned up ten hits, including a reference by Sen. 
Larry Craig (R-ID) arguing that political pork-barrelling was a political tragedy of 
the commons (136 Cong.Rec. H4389-0, June 20, 1990), and Sen. Charles Grassley 
(R- IA) arguing pollution is a tragedy of the commons, and should be alleviated by 
federal subsidies for production of corn-based fuels (137 Cong. Rec. S6024-01, May 
16, 1991).
4. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual 
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 141-43, citing William M. Landes and Richard 
Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 475 (2003).
5. Ian Ayres and Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 
87-93 (2003).
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over-litigation,6 neglect of Presidential papers,7 overcrowding of the 
radio spectrum,8 overcrowding of the wireless telecommunications 
spectrum,9 sidewalk vending,10 greenhouse gas emissions,11 water 
pollution,12 underground water overdrafting,13 and of course, the 
classic environmental commons problem, overfishing.14 But this 
embarrassment of citation riches highlights the fact that although we 
invoke it often, we do not know exactly what constitutes a tragedy of 
the commons.
Defining a tragedy of the commons is not just an academic 
exercise. In an ideological policy battle between interventionists and 
libertarians, those that argue for and against governmental 
intervention, a true tragedy of the commons situation presents a 
potentially decisive argument in favor of intervention. In a true 
tragedy of the commons, resource users impose mutual externalities 
upon each other, creating a paternalistic justification for intervention. 
Of course, in over-exploiting a resource, resource users may also 
impose externalities upon a larger group that has some stake in the 
resource, such as the general public might have in clean air or water. 
This externality alone may be sufficient justification for intervening. 
But as I define it in this Article, a tragedy of the commons specifically 
involves a situation in which the resource users are detracting from 
their own ability to continue to exploit the resource. For those trapped 
in the tragedy, it is a self-defeating pathology that flies in the face of 
6. Francis E. Mcgovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. 
REV. 1721, 1721-22 (2002).
7. Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular Government: the 
Convergence and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and Control of 
Presidential Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 651 (2003).
8. Karl Manheim and Lawrence B. Solum, An Economic Analysis of Domain 
Name Policy, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359, 416 (2003).
9. Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless 
Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863, 936 (2004).
10. Gregg W. Kettles, Regulating Vending in the Sidewalk Commons, 77 TEMP. 
L. REV. 1 (2004).
11. Roberta Mann, Waiting to Exhale? Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 
AM. U. L. REV. 1135, 1145 (2002); Laura Kosloff and Mark Trexler, State Climate 
Change Initiatives: Think Locally, Act Globally, 18-WTR NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 
46, 46 (2004).
12. Richard J. Lazarus, Celebrating Tahoe-Sierra, 33 EVNTL. L. 1, 5 (2003).
13. David J. Hayes, Privatization and Control of U.S. Water Supplies, 18 FALL 
NAT. RESOURCES & EVNT. 19 (2003).
14. Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust As An 
Obstacle to Marine Resource Conservation, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 3, 3 (2004).
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economic reason, and yet, as I will demonstrate in this Article, is 
perfectly consistent with economic assumptions of rationality. The 
need to save the resource users from themselves provides, independent 
of the need to internalize other large-group externalities, a particularly 
compelling case for governmental intervention. In true tragedies of the 
commons, Pareto Superior15 policy moves are possible in ways that 
are generally not feasible in other putative tragedies of the commons, 
in which this self-destructiveness is absent. I use the definition set 
forth in this Article to analyze a problem that has not been previously 
recognized as a tragedy of the commons – the problem of ever-
increasing political campaign expenditures.
In part II of this Article, I set out my definition of a tragedy of 
the commons, using the overfishing problem and other examples to 
illustrate what is unique about this class of problems. In so doing, I 
distinguish it from the broader set of large-group externality problems 
that are mischaracterized as tragedies of the commons problems, such 
as air and water pollution. In part III of this Article I use the 
overfishing problem to illustrate the dynamics of tragedies of the 
commons, showing how resource degradation over time impacts 
resource users. In part IV of this Article I apply this analysis to the 
problem of political campaign spending, showing how the problem is 
similar to the problem of overfishing, and showing how the current 
campaign spending debate, framed as freedom versus equality, is 
misguided. In part V of this Article, I address the question of why 
those trapped in a tragedy of the commons are not more eager to 
address their joint overexploitation problem. Finally, in part VI, I 
discuss solutions to tragedies of the commons, in particular those for 
the campaign spending problem.
II. The Tragedy of the Commons
A. Hardin's True Tragedy
Hardin's tragedy of the commons has proven to be a worthy 
foil to Adam Smith's much older parable of the "invisible hand."16
15. A Pareto Superior policy is one in which at least one member of society is 
made better off, and none are made worse off. ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. 
WHINSTON, AND JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 313 (1995).
16. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS  vii-ix, 7-32 (George Stigler, ed., Crofts Classics 1957). Stigler 
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Hardin's story of resource overexploitation poses a striking contrast to 
Smith's narrative illustrating the coincidence of self-interest and 
collective interest. Whereas Smith's lesson is that individuals acting in 
their self-interest will act to increase collective wealth,17 Hardin's 
lesson is that individuals acting in their self-interest will ruin
collective wealth.18 Consciously or not, all varieties of public policy 
are debated in ways that draw heavily upon at least one of these two 
powerful concepts. Indeed, these two competing ideas, based upon 
antithetical conceptions of the ability of people to order their own 
affairs, often serve as the underlying bases of arguments for and 
against governmental intervention. Hardin and Smith serve, in this 
policy realm, as the ideological beacons of opposing viewpoints of the 
role of government.
Whereas the implication of Smith's narrative is quite clear –
government should intervene as little as possible – the implications of 
Hardin's tragedy are not. Several different forms of policy 
prescriptions could be proposed to solve the "commons" problem.19 In 
his article, Hardin called for "mutual coercion, mutually agreed 
upon."20 But what does this mean? In the stylized examples provided 
by Hardin, a variety of policy responses might be appropriate. To 
address the overpopulation problem,21 some sort of a taxation scheme 
might be the most palatable, or simply a termination of some social 
programs that Hardin would consider subsidies for having more 
characterizes Smith's concept as an "identity of interest" between self- and collective 
interests.
17. Id. at vii-ix. Stigler characterizes Smith's concept as an "identity of interest" 
between self- and collective interests. Smith's treatment of the division of labor, in 
which self-interested individuals agree to divide up productive tasks and increase 
overall production, serves as one example of how self-interest can help produce 
increases in collective wealth. Id., at 7-32.
18. Hardin details numerous examples of what he thinks of as a tragedy of the 
commons, but most telling is his ultimate rationale for intervention – "mutual 
coercion, mutually agreed upon." Supra, note 1, at 1246. 
19. Scholars have long noted that Hardin's "commons" problem is more 
powerfully applied in an "open access" setting, where no ownership rights exist at 
all, as distinguished from a common-pool resource. Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, 
and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 106 (2003); Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of 
Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades, and Ecosystems. 83 
MINN. L. REV. 129, 144 (1998); Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework for 
Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813, 816 (2003).
20. Hardin, supra, note 1, at 1245.
21. Hardin, supra, note 1, at  1243.
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children.22 To address resource over-exploitation problems such as the 
overgrazing problem posed by Hardin,23 privatization of the resource 
may be called for.24 To address the problem of pollution,25 some form 
of pollution control regulation may be called for. Hardin's message 
was that something needs to be done, but he did not seem to 
distinguish between a governmental solution and a privatization 
solution, or any range of options in between.
I suggest that Hardin's greatest contribution, the core insight of 
his article, is the identification of a class of problems in which there is 
a need to protect resource users from themselves, and to protect their 
continued access to the resource by limiting access. This is the key to 
what scholars find most anomalous about the tragedy of the commons: 
that protecting resource users requires constraining their liberty in 
some way. This is necessary because, despite the irrationality of 
embarking upon the tragic course of over-exploitation, people persist 
in doing so. If a tragic player could take a long-term view of resource 
exploitation, or find a way to cooperate with fellow resource users –
hardly heroic things to expect26 – the tragedy could be avoided. Yet 
tragedies persist, particularly in environmental settings.27 This refusal 
of resource users to recognize their enlightened self-interest, as well, is 
one of those aspects of the tragedy that scholars find so compelling.
This can be distinguished from the broader class of large-group 
externality problems in which resource users impose externalities upon 
a larger population, without necessarily harming themselves in the 
process. The confusion exists because in both types of problems, the 
overexploitation pertains to jointly-owned or unowned resources. 
These property regimes serve as the root cause of overexploitation. 
But Hardin's prescription of "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon," 
seems oriented towards solving problems within the resource user 
group, and not necessarily (but often) alleviating externalities imposed 
upon those outside of the user group.
22. Hardin, supra, note 1, at 1246.
23. Hardin, supra, note 1, at 1244.
24. Ostrom certainly believed that this is what Demsetz called for in his 
seminal article, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 13 (1967), 
OSTROM, supra, note 2, at 12-13.
25. Hardin, supra, note 1, at 1245.
26. Ostrom's famous book pertains to the conditions under which cooperative 
arrangements, formal and informal, can solve common-pool resource problems.
27. Barton H. Thompson, Tragically Difficult: Obstacles to Governing the 
Commons, 30 ENVTL. LAW 241 (2000).
What IS Tragedy of the Commons?6
What is a "true" tragedy of the commons? I suggest that a truly 
tragic resource overexploitation, or a true tragedy of the commons, 
contains all of the following elements:
(1) Mutual, uninternalized externalities. A tragedy of the 
commons involves, if not perfectly symmetrical situations among 
identical players, at least a mutuality of externalities. The mutuality of 
externality places parties in mirroring situations in which every tragic 
player knows that attempts at cooperative behavior will be met with 
cheating, and that every player knows that every player knows this. 
Knowing that if one doesn't cheat, others will, creates irresistible 
incentives to cheat.
(2) Group payoffs that are less in uncooperative outcomes than 
they are in cooperative ones. Professor Lee Ann Fennell has 
distinguished the tragedy of the commons from mere distributive 
questions. If uncooperative behavior merely led to a wealth transfer, 
then there is not necessarily any efficiency loss suffered from the 
societal point of view.28
(3) A resource that is rivalrous in consumption. While 
situations involving nonrival goods may also produce incentives for 
uncooperative behavior, rivalrous consumption among those in a 
competitive environment creates particularly strong incentives to 
cheat. The understanding that consumption by others detracts from 
one's own consumption, coupled with the mutuality of externalities 
and the knowledge that this will likely lead to cheating by others, is 
what gives rise to the inevitability of uncooperative behavior.
A game-theoretic illustration may be helpful to demonstrate the 
logic of tragic behavior, and an economic explanation of why the 
tragedy can be so persistent. Consider a game involving two 
fishermen, A and B, that will last for 100 time periods. The fishery is 
assumed to have a capacity to sustainably yield 100 fish caught per 
period. If in any period, the total fish caught by A and B exceeds 100, 
the stock will be depleted and the capacity will fall to 99 for the 
following period and for all periods thereafter. Thus, if A and B could 
agree, they could sustainably harvest 100 fish per period for the entire 
100 periods. As a baseline, assume that A and B would evenly split the 
100 fish each period, and harvest 50 each. In any period, A or B could 
"cheat" and fish harder to catch an extra fish, or could "abstain," and 
maintain a current level and effort of fishing. It is further assumed that 
28. Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 
919-922 (2004).
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A B
abstain { 0, 0 }abstain
A
cheat
{ -99, +1 }abstain
Figure 1
the effort from fishing is of negligible cost to these fishermen. The 
gain of catching extra fish is of paramount consideration. 
If, in time period one, T1, A abstains from cheating and B 
decides to cheat, B will gain an extra fish for T1. A will have harvested 
50 fish and B 51 fish, yielding 101 fish in T1 but knocking the harvest 
capacity down to 99 for T2 and all periods thereafter. Assuming B 
maintains the higher fishing effort for the remainder of the game, it is 
reasonable to assume that in future time periods, A and B will divide 
the 99 fish by harvesting, respectively, 49 and 50 fish. The net for the 
entire game would thus be that B will have gained one fish, and A, by 
losing out on a fish for each of the rest of the 99 periods, will have lost 
99 fish, net of her 
baseline of 50 fish 
per year. If A does 
not retaliate by 
cheating but rather 
abstains, the game 
can be represented 
by Figure 1, and the 
payoffs shown in 
Table 1. 
    Table 1
T A B
1 50 51
2 49 50
3-100 49 50
It is reasonable to assume, however, that A would retaliate. In 
fact it would be perfectly rational for A to do so. If A chose, in T2, to 
cheat by fishing a little harder as well, she would also net an extra fish 
– 50 instead of 49, and by both of them catching a total of 100 fish in 
T2, in an environment in which the yield capacity is 99, A would play 
her part in knocking the capacity in T3 and subsequent time periods 
down to 98. In T3 and thereafter, assuming that A and B fish equally 
hard, it is reasonable to assume that they would split the catch at 49 
apiece. This assumes B abstains from further cheating. This outcome 
is shown in Figure 2 and the payoffs in Table 2. A's payoff would be 
less by one fish for the remaining 98 periods, resulting in a net payoff 
of -98, relative to her baseline of 50 fish per year; B's payoff would 
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A B
abstain { 0, 0 }abstain
A
cheat
{ -99, +1 }abstain
B
cheat
{ -98, -97 }abstain
Figure 2
also reflect this reduced payoff, but B would have benefited by 
cheating early and catching an extra fish in T1, yielding a net payoff of 
-97. Although A has embarked upon the path to mutually tragic 
overexploitation, A is better off cheating as compared to the "abstain" 
strategy. By catching an extra fish in T2, A at least got an extra fish in 
T2, making her payoff less negative, -98 instead of -99. If B chooses to 
abstain from further 
cheating, B will, 
despite her elevated 
effort, also catch 
one less fish for the 
rest of the 98 
periods. 
   Table 2
T A B
1 50 51
2 50 50
3-100 49 49
The game is likely to descend further, however. At time T3, B 
may not abstain and may well decide that she is not ready to settle for 
harvesting only 49 fish per year. The same calculus applies at T3 as it 
did at T1: B can gain an extra fish by fishing a little harder still, 
catching 50 fish in T3, and even if the yield capacity is knocked further 
down to 97, by virtue of A and B catching a total of 99 fish in an 
environment in which the capacity is 98, B will nevertheless realize a 
temporary, one-period gain of a fish. For the remainder of the game, B 
will be fishing harder still just to catch 49 fish per year. Because B is 
fishing harder than A, it is reasonable to assume that A and B will split 
the catch at 48 and 49 fish, respectively. Thus, B will be working even 
harder to catch even fewer fish, catching 49 for the remainder of the 
game for a game-total net of -96 (a loss of a fish for the remainder of 
the 97 periods, more the extra fish caught in T1). But this is a better 
outcome than the final outcome in Figure 2, in which her net was -97. 
A, in the meantime, will suffer a loss of two fish every year for years 4 
through 100, and loss of one fish in T3, for a game-total of -195 below 
the baseline of 50 per year. 
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A B
abstain { 0, 0 }abstain
A
cheat
{ -99, +1 }abstain
B
cheat
{ -98, -97 }abstain
Figure 3
A { -195, -96 }abstain
cheat
B { -194, -192 }abstain
cheat
What next? At T4, A may decide to fish still harder as well. 
While A realizes that this is ultimately a fool's errand, A realizes that 
she can at least snare an extra fish for one year by fishing harder. A 
realizes that the yield capacity will be knocked down to 96, a yield 
which will be split by A and B at 48 fish apiece, given their equally 
hard fishing efforts (and assuming B abstains from further cheating). 
But A was going to settle for 48 fish per year anyway, so she reasons 
that she might as 
well get the extra 
fish this year. A had 
already lost a fish in 
T3 and was going 
lose 2 fish per year 
for at least the last 96 
years, and by snaring 
an extra fish in T4, A at least 
reduces her loss down from 195 
to 194. As in previous cases, the 
externality imposed upon B is 
huge. The outcome is shown in 
Figure 3, and the resulting catches 
are shown in Table 3. 
   Table 3
T A B
1 50 51
2 50 50
3 49 50
4 49 49
5-100 48 48
Several interesting things are worth noting about Figure 3. 
First, while the miniscule private gains are swamped by the huge 
social losses, from an individual's point of view, it remains rational to 
pursue the tragic path. At each decision node, it pays, though slightly 
to cheat rather than abstain. The externality remains uninternalized. 
Second, A's reward for abstaining in T1 was to suffer an inferior 
payoff to B in every time period. Thus, there is not only no incentive 
to ever abstain, but there is a compelling incentive to cheat, and cheat 
first. The compelling incentive to cheat is not simply the miniscule 
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gain of one fish in one time period, but the realization that abstention 
will be met with cheating. Herein lies the inevitability of the tragedy: 
the incentives to cheat are irresistible. They are irresistible because of 
the symmetrical nature of the externalities, and the mutual realizations 
that any abstention will be punished, and the realization that the other 
player understands that her abstention will be punished. Moreover, 
even if some sort of regulatory regime were put in place to try and 
police cheating, if the regime does not address the incentive to cheat, 
enforcement is likely to be problematic.29
One might object that the players in the above game might also 
agree to underharvest for a year or two, just to allow the fish stock to 
build back up. By the same reasoning as that illustrated in the game, 
the gains from cooperation might swamp those of adopting a cheating 
strategy. Even then, however, the incentives to cheat are present, and 
as a formal economic matter what makes tragedies of the common 
truly, inevitably tragic are those compelling incentives to cheat, which 
all but ensure the predominance of non-cooperative strategies. 
Exceptions exist, of course. Professor Elinor Ostrom's seminal 
work on cooperative arrangements identified a number of sustainably-
harvested common-pool resources, sometimes managed and exploited 
by fairly large groups.30 However, the conditions that must exist 
before such large groups can come together in a cooperative 
arrangement are unique.31 The failures remain the rule, and the 
successes the exception.32
There is the possible objection that the assumption in the 
illustrative game that fishing effort is negligible compared with the 
harvesting gains is, at a certain point, unrealistic. As fishing effort 
increases, the cost of effort is likely to increase, and the benefits likely 
to decrease due to diminishing returns. At some point, it becomes 
unprofitable to overexploit, or to exploit at all, thereby putting an end 
to the cycle of overexploitation. This objection does not, however, 
29. For example, fisheries regulation must always address enforcement issues 
due to the atomistic nature of the fishing industry. Many ingenious regulatory 
schemes have failed for lack of ability to enforce the restrictions. SUZANNE 
IUDICELLO, FISH, MARKETS, AND FISHERMEN: THE ECONOMICS OF OVERFISHING 26, 
38, 133 (1999).
30. Supra, note 2. 
31. Ostrom analyzes eight similarities among those common-pool resources 
that have been managed and harvested sustainably, despite the lack of property 
ownership. Ostrom, supra, note 2, at 88-102.
32. Thompson, supra, note 27 at 242.
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detract from the generality of this game. The level of harvesting at 
which profitability disappears completely is apt to be at a level of 
harvesting that is sub-optimally high. 
To illustrate this last point, consider the example of a fishery, 
shown in Figure 4, in which the marginal benefits and average benefits 
of exploitation decrease as harvesting level increases. We can assume 
constant marginal and average costs without loss of generality. The 
optimal harvesting point is level qo, at which marginal benefits equal 
marginal costs. However, as long as there are no entry barriers – as 
there would be if there were private ownership of the fishery or some 
entry restrictions – capital will enter as long as there are non-zero rents 
to be had, and will dissipate total (industry-wide) rents by increasing 
overall harvesting. One inefficiently high level of harvesting might be 
q1, at which marginal benefits have sunk below marginal costs. But at 
q1 rents still exist in the form of rectangle abcd, inducing more capital 
to enter. Economic models of overfishing have demonstrated that 
capital will continue to enter and overharvesting will continue to 
increase until a stopping point is reached, well beyond the optimum 
harvest level. At this point of "rent dissipation," qrd in the graph, 
marginal benefits are well below marginal costs, but average costs are 
just equal to marginal costs.33 Rents are zero. Herein lies the tragedy 
of the overfishing commons – fishermen literally fish themselves into 
poverty.34
33. H, Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource, 
62 J. POLITICAL ECONOMY 124, 130-132 (1954). 
34. Id.
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Level of fishing effort
q0 qrd
a
d
c
b
q1
Figure 4
One possible regulatory strategy would thus be to do nothing –
give up on solving the tragedy of the commons, and allow the situation 
to deteriorate to the point of rent dissipation. Such a course would in 
effect be a determination that rent dissipation is a lesser evil than an 
inappropriate regulatory response. At the point of rent dissipation, at 
least, the fish will get a break. This may be a plausible approach for 
some tragedy of the commons problems. For problems that truly are 
intractable, for which any regulatory response or property rights 
solution would be truly abhorrent or unworkable, this may be the 
answer. Or, it could be that the plundered resource is a resilient one, so 
that any respite from overexploitation will allow it to quickly bounce 
back to healthy levels. Or, as in the case of some fisheries, it may be 
that the capital used in exploiting a stock is a fluid one that exits the 
industry easily, avoiding the danger that the capital will get locked into 
the resource and compelled irreparably overexploit it.35
35. Paterson and Wilen showed that where the exploited resource is resilient –
that it bounces back from depletion quickly – the danger of irreversible over-
exploitation is low. Donald G. Paterson and James Wilen, Depletion and Diplomacy: 
the North Pacific Seal Hunt, 1886-1910, 2 RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 81, 
121-127 (1977). Also, where capital exits and enters the fishery quickly and easily, 
there is less danger that capital will have to rely solely on the fishery for income. 
Once the stock is depleted enough to render exploitation unprofitable, the fishermen 
will exit the fishery, concentrate on another, more profitable species, and return only 
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However, for many, if not most tragedy of the commons 
problems, such a let-the-chips-fall-where-they-may approach seems 
inadequate. The problem is that irreparable harm may have already 
occurred at the rent dissipation level. In the fishing example, it is 
possible that rent dissipation may not occur until the fish stock has 
crashed to the point that it is driven to extinction or will never recover. 
Also, the economic harm to the resource users is usually not our only 
concern. Resource overexploitation usually imposes externalities upon 
the rest of the world. Loss of a fish species will invariably upset 
ecological balances in ways that are impossible to predict.
Clearly, this purely economic story is not the complete 
explanation for the prevalence and persistence of tragedies. There exist 
psychological phenomena that pose obstacles to solving tragedies of 
the commons,36 that are imperfectly modeled (if at all) by formal 
economic models. However, the tragedy of the commons is largely an 
economic story, and this account is the more detailed economic 
account of why the tragedy persists.
B. Distinguished From Other Large-Group Externality 
Problems
What I define in this Article as a "true" tragedy of the 
commons can be distinguished from other large-group externality 
problems involving jointly-owned or unowned resources. There are 
two important differences: (1) a tragedy of the commons involves an 
externality imposed by resource users that they impose upon each 
other by damaging their own ability to exploit the resource, and (2) the 
exploited resource is rivalrous in consumption.
A tragedy of the commons does not preclude, of course, the 
imposition of externalities on those outside the group. Fish consumers, 
ichthyologists, conservationists, and those otherwise intrinsically 
interested in preserving fish stocks would suffer negative externalities 
at the hands of the tragic fishermen even as the latter destroy their own 
livelihood. But the existence of an externality imposed by resource 
users on those outside the group is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for a tragedy of the commons. A tragedy of the commons 
when the stock is healthy enough to exploit profitably again. Id., at 121-27. This is 
not to say that this exploitive pattern is ideal, only that the dangers of irreparable 
harm are less in some circumstances than others.
36. Thompson, supra, note 27, and Section VI. infra.
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can be self-contained, with resource users destroying themselves 
without harming anyone outside of the group. As well, unless resource 
users are harming themselves by overexploitation, the imposition of an 
externality upon those outside the group does not, by my definition, 
make the situation a tragedy of the commons.
Consider the example of air pollution. Hardin himself thought 
this to be an example of a tragedy of the commons, only it involves the 
excessive putting in of something – pollution – rather than the 
excessive taking out of a scarce resource.37 There is a similarity in that 
the calculus facing the individual – the polluter enjoys the full benefit 
of polluting, just as the herdsman enjoys the full benefit of grazing an 
additional animal, while the costs are shared among many.38 However, 
whereas there is a paternalistic justification for intervention in a 
tragedy of the commons, intervention in the more general case must be 
justified on the grounds of internalizing externalities to others.
It is true that air polluters would benefit from pollution 
regulation in an indirect way, as members of the air-breathing public. 
Is the difference, then, between a tragedy of the commons and other 
large-group externality problems merely a matter of degree? The 
answer is no, because in a tragedy of the commons, regulation confers 
very different benefits upon the resource users than upon the larger 
group. In the overfishing case, regulation that saves fish stocks confers 
upon the general public a continued supply of fish, ecological integrity 
by preserving a possibly important part of the aquatic ecosystem, and 
perhaps the psychic value of knowing that we have not decimated yet 
another species out of carelessness. Like the rest of the world, 
fishermen enjoy these benefits. But what is also conferred upon the 
fishermen is a continued ability to fish and practice their livelihood. 
This is a benefit that is very different from those consumption and 
conservation benefits that are enjoyed by the diffuse public, and the 
existence of this additional benefit is what characterizes a tragedy of 
the commons. By contrast, regulation that reduces air pollution yields 
similar benefits to air polluters and air breathers alike. There is no 
argument that limiting air pollution helps air polluters in any way in 
their polluting efforts, or preserves their ability to pollute in the future. 
Thus, while all large-group externality problems will realize benefits 
from regulation that inure to the large group (typically the general 
public), in a tragedy of the commons resource users will receive the 
37. Supra, note 1, at 1245.
38. Supra, note 1, at 1244.
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additional benefit of being saved from their own improvidence and the 
ability to carry on the future with their resource exploitation.
Intervention may be entirely warranted, perhaps even 
compelling, for a variety of large-group externality problems such as 
air and water pollution.39 But the nature of the justification for such 
large-group externality problems is apt to be different than it is for 
tragedies of the commons. The justification for arresting other large-
group externality problems may be varied and complicated, and may 
involve difficult ethical questions regarding tradeoffs between 
economic growth and ecological or human health. A cost-benefit 
analysis may or may not be appropriate for making such decisions. But 
the case for arresting tragedies of the commons is apt to include one 
additional, simple and compelling justification: save the resource users 
from themselves. This is also not to say that successful regulation is 
always possible or feasible. But the case for trying is stronger. 
The second distinguishing feature of a tragedy of the commons 
is that the resource being overexploited is rivalrous in consumption. 
Rivalrous consumption is what gives urgency to the race to exploit, 
and creates compelling incentives to cheat. This incentive is illustrated 
by the game-theoretic model of the tragedy, in which A's abstinence, 
even temporary, resulted in her having an inferior payoff to B in every 
time period. With a non-rival resource problem such as air pollution, 
the capacity to pollute is not hindered by the very fact of their 
pollution. However harmful air pollution has been for public health, 
polluting has not bumped up against any absolute physical limits that 
would prevent polluters from continuing to pollute. Polluters thus do 
not face the same compelling incentives to pollute.40 To be sure, there 
are competitive forces that compel polluters to pollute, but there is no 
39. A cost benefit analysis of the Clean Air Act, for example, showed 
compliance costs of over $600 billion, but environmental benefits in excess of $22 
trillion. Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA], Office of Air and 
Radiation, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990 ES-8 (Oct. 
1997).
40. Lessig argues that for nonrivalrous goods, there is no possibility of a 
"tragedy of the commons," since nonrivalry means that availability for users does not 
diminish with increased consumption. Lessig, note 2, at 22-23. Lessig is arguing for 
leaving in the commons some intellectual property because of the positive network 
effects of such knowledge. However, the point of the tragedy of the commons
metaphor, as applied to pollution problems, is that there are negative externalities 
associated with pollution, that do not diminish pollution opportunities, but should 
nevertheless be curtailed.
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race to spew out the pollution before someone else has the 
opportunity.
C. Other Examples of Tragedies of the Commons
The tragedy of the commons is usually considered a story 
about property and property rights. For example, one prescription for 
fixing the tragedy is the establishment of private property rights, so 
that there is no externality. Like property law itself, the tragedy of the 
commons has insinuated itself into a variety of problems not involving 
real property, or any physical res. While Smith and Merrill caution us 
against extending property law too far into the non-physical realm and 
forgetting the in rem nature of property law,41 it is still very much 
worth remembering the lessons that property problems teach us for 
purposes of solving a variety of public policy problems.
1. Traffic Congestion
Among students who have taken my environmental law 
courses in both Canada and the U.S., the most consistently identifiable 
tragedy of the commons problem is that of traffic congestion. Traffic 
congestion provides an excellent pedagogical device for teaching the 
tragedy of the commons. Because drivers all face the same decision 
environment, the problem of traffic illustrates the role of mutuality in 
explaining the persistence of an externality. Also, the traffic problem 
showcases the importance of transaction costs in frustrating non-
coercive solutions, in that negotiations among commuters are 
impossible. Finally, traffic congestion illustrates the effects of 
overutilization of a resource that is rivalrous in consumption: roads. 
Like other tragedies of the commons, resource users inflict losses upon 
themselves as a group in terms of the ability to use the resource, by
lengthening commute times and degrading the transportation resource. 
Externalities are also imposed upon non-users, the air-breathing 
public, in the form of pollution.  But this is a separate and distinct 
large-group externality, that is not itself the tragedy of the commons. 
The politically safest justification for intervention is to save 
commuting drivers and protect their commuting experiences. 
Significantly, the hue and cry for solving traffic problems comes more 
41. Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill, Whatever Happened to Property in Law 
and Economics? 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001).
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typically from frustrated drivers than those who worry about the air 
pollution externality being imposed upon the general public.42
The traditional engineering solution to traffic congestion has 
been to expand roadway capacity. As most traffic engineers now 
understand, this can be a self-defeating strategy, as expanding 
roadway capacity has the effect of reducing transportation costs so that 
new demands are created by new users – new residential development, 
for example, that springs up specifically because of the new roadway 
capacity.43 This is an example of the kind of solution that ignores the 
second-order effects, those that are easily seen once one appreciates 
the nature of the externality. More thoughtful approaches have thus 
been oriented towards internalizing the congestion externality, and 
trying to alter the incentives to participate in the tragedy. This has 
been attempted by trying to draw people out of the pool of resource 
users, by imposing a time-of-day-sensitive congestion tax44 and by 
subsidizing alternative transportation modes such as transit and 
bicycling.45 Or, incentives may be provided to induce people to at least 
make utilization of the roads more efficient, by encouraging 
carpooling through the creation of high-occupancy vehicle lanes.46
While not exactly like the overfishing problem, traffic congestion 
creates the same dynamics.47
42. See, e.g., Chip Jones, Virginia Governor's Funding Initiative Sparks New 
Hopes for Rail, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, December 24, 2004, at 7 (noting that a 
rail expansion plan in Northern Virginia promised to bring relief to "angry 
commuters tired of getting stuck in traffic."); Duane Stanford, Toll Lanes Urged to 
Ease Gridlock, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, November 30, 2004 at A1 
("Frustrated communters would be able to buy their way out of traffic jams or ride 
trainlike express buses if the newest proposal to attack long commutes on Interstates 
75 and 575 through Cobb and Cherokee counties is enacted"); Stephen Ginsburg, Va. 
To Build Private Toll Lanes, WASHINGTON POST, August 27, 2004 at A1 ("Officials 
have embraced the concept as a way to give motorists relief from chronic tie-ups").
43. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social 
Norms: Commodifying California's Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L. J. 1231, 1243-49 
(2000).
44. Id., at 1243-47.
45. Id., at 1238; Oliver A. Pollard, Smart Growth: the Promise, Politics, and 
Potential Pitfalls of Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19 Va. Envtl. L. J. 
247, 260 (2000).
46. Id., at 1238-41.
47. The traffic problem is somewhat different from the overfishing problem in 
that there are no "stock" effects, in which excessive current consumption somehow 
harms the potential for future consumption. But the rivalrous nature of the resource 
still creates compelling incentives to cheat. Indeed, no serious attempt is ever made 
to induce people to not drive so as to make others' commutes more expedient.
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2. Performance-enhancing Substances in Sports
Seemingly continuous revelations of the use of performance-
enhancing drugs being used by professional athletes have exacted a 
toll on the image of the affected sports. Baseball star Barry Bonds 
recently demurred suspiciously to inquiries regarding his knowledge 
about substances that his trainer provided him that are now thought to 
have been steroids.48 Bonds claims to have believed that he was 
receiving flaxseed oil from his trainer, who remains under federal 
indictment for his connection with an alleged trafficker of illegal 
performance-enhancing drugs.49 Bonds has hit 703 career home runs, 
and is within reach of Hank Aaron's Major League record of 755 home 
runs, an approach that would normally be cause for celebration.50 But 
Bonds, never a popular star to begin with, has seen his image further 
tarnished by this scandal, and it seems likely that his remarkable 
accomplishments will be overshadowed by his use of steroids.51
There are those athletes that would not trade places with 
Bonds, knowing that the use of such substances will exact a health toll 
in the long run. Anabolic steroids have been linked to a variety of 
health disorders, such as infertility, baldness, distorted genitalia, and a 
heightened danger of drug dependence.52 And yet, because of the 
exorbitant payoffs of baseball success, there are those that choose to 
make that tradeoff.53 The late baseball star Ken Caminiti, who in a 
48. Dave Anderson, Bonds' Excuse Has the Scent of Snake Oil, Not Arthritis 
Balm,  N.Y. TIMES, December 7, 2004 at D1; Dave Anderson, 2004: Steroids; Bonds 
and Giambi Testify and Change the Playing Field, N.Y. TIMES, December 26, 2004 
at 87. 
49. Id.
50. Donna Liquori, At a Shrine to Baseball, Steroid Inquiry Inspires Shame, 
N.Y. TIMES, December 5, 2004, at 811.
51. Art Thiel, Baseball Immortality Bruised by Injuries, Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, February 10, 2005 at D1 (The Giants' star has 703 home runs, but the 
steroids scandal has baseball in a magnum twist about how to salute the pending 
surrender of its most hallowed individual record by a guy who looks more and more 
like a sports crook").
52. Mayo Clinic, Steroids and sports: a Dangerous Mix? Available online at 
MayoClinic.com, at http://www.mayoclinic.com/invoke.cfm?objectid=7C05F9A5-
A456-4391-AE4457129F6337A1 (last visited February 17, 2005).
53. In effectively admitting steroid use, Bonds joins other baseball sluggers 
such as the late Ken Caminiti, Gary Sheffield, Jason Giambi, and Jose Canseco. Id.; 
Stefan Fatsis, History Slowed Baseball's Move to Curb Steroids, WALL ST. J., 
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2002 interview, was one of the first baseball players to admit to using 
steroids, remained unapologetic for using it. Two years before his 
death by drug overdose, Caminiti told a Sports Illustrated reporter that 
he felt that steroids had become a "widely-accepted," and even 
"necessary" means of maintaining a competitive edge in baseball.54
Caminiti estimated that "at least half" of all Major League players use 
steroids, while Major League Baseball physicians estimated that ten to 
fifteen percent of all minor leaguers they examined tested positive for 
steroids.
Baseball success is an extremely lucrative resource that is 
extremely rivalrous in consumption. Baseball success necessarily 
precludes success by others. Achieving and maintaining a competitive 
edge, even a small one, can be the difference between success and 
failure. The incentives to cheat by using steroids and other 
performance-enhancing substances is intense. In the same Sports 
Illustrated interview, Caminiti offered this perspective on the use of 
steroids:
"If a young player were to ask me what to do … I'm not 
going to tell him it's bad. Look at all the money in the 
game: You have a chance to set your family up, to get 
your daughter into a better school.... So I can't say, 
'Don't do it,' not when the guy next to you is as big as a 
house and he's going to take your job and make the 
money."55
While Caminiti evinces no regrets for using steroids, he 
recognizes that steroids are a necessary evil due to the competitive 
pressures of baseball. Putting aside the loss to those players that can 
successfully cheat and could not succeed at baseball without cheating, 
the vast majority of players would be better off with an effective and 
enforceable ban on the use of performance-enhancing drugs. 
Ballplayers would then face a baseball career not competing with 
cheaters that use performance-enhancing drugs, not being pressured to 
December 9, 2004, at B1; Dave Anderson, Is Anybody Listening to Caminiti's 
Steroids Alarm? N.Y. TIMES, October 13, 2004 at D1.
54. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED MAGAZINE, Totally Juiced: with the use of steroids 
and other performance enhancers rampant, according to a former MVP and other 
sources, baseball players and their reliance on drugs have grown to alarming 
proportions, June 3, 2002, at 34.
55. Id.
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cheat, and if already cheating, not being pressured to cheat more, and 
cheat in more expensive and even more unhealthful ways. It is thus the 
players – the resource users – that truly do need to be saved from 
themselves. Appeals by civil libertarians would ring somewhat hollow 
in this context.
The mysterious deaths of eight young, apparently healthy 
professional cyclists in a seventeen-month period spanning 2003 and 
2004 would be shocking if there had not already been strong 
suspicions that the sport is still plagued by the misuse of dangerous 
performance-enhancing drugs and by dangerous blood doping 
practices.56 Even 1998 Tour de France champion Marco Pantani, who 
died mysteriously last year from a drug overdose, had been ejected 
from a race in 1999 for blood doping, and had continually battled 
allegations of blood doping and drug use since then.57 It is incredible 
that cyclists persist in taking such high risks to succeed, particularly 
one of Pantani's stature. But given the highly rivalrous nature of 
winning cycling races, the incentive to cheat is apparently irresistible. 
It is clear that it would be cyclists that would benefit from an 
enforceable and effective ban, in that they would no longer be risking 
their lives to succeed. The apparent impossibility of enforcing such a 
ban, however, does not portend well for the sport.
III. The Fish Problem
Despite the many applications of Hardin's tragedy of the 
commons, open access fisheries have somehow borne out Hardin's 
predictions the most faithfully.58 Examples abound, but a particularly 
striking example of the depletion of fish stocks in an open access 
situation is provided by the late nineteenth-century and early 
twentieth-century Pacific halibut fishery. The Pacific halibut fishery 
56. Ron Kroichick, Baseball has BALCO, but Europe is plagued with its own 
sports drug scandal: EPO and bicycling, S.F. CHRON, May 9, 2004, at C1.
57. Obituaries, Marco Pantani, 34, Cyclist Plagued by Doping Allegations, 
L.A. TIMES, February 15, 2004, at B19.
58. Hardin made the mistake of confusing a "commons" with "open access."  It 
is now commonly understood that a "commons" resource situation involves a
resource that is jointly owned by multiple individuals, while "open access" is one in 
which there is no ownership at all. A common-pool resource is thus one that can be 
considered as open access on the "inside," (within the group of joint owners) but 
private property on the "outside" (outside the group of joint owners). Carol Rose, 
The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades 
and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998).
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was unregulated until 1924,59 when the United States and Canada 
created by treaty the International Pacific Halibut Commission, a body 
charged with studying the halibut fishery and making 
recommendations on halibut fishery management.60 Another treaty in 
1931 implemented aggregate catch limits for several intensively-fished 
areas,61 which produced an immediate reduction in amount of fishing 
effort and a concomitant increase in fishing efficiency.62
The early twentieth-century history of the Pacific halibut 
fishery illustrates: (i) the incentive for individual fishermen to 
overfish, resulting in a collective overfishing; (ii) a general increase in 
effort in fishing; and (iii) a markedly consistent decrease in fishing 
efficiency, measured by quantity of catch per quantity of fishing effort. 
Table 4 shows recorded pacific halibut landings on the Pacific Coast 
of the Southeastern Alaska, Canada, and Washington State for the 
years 1910 to 1933.63 In table 4, the second column shows the total 
pounds of halibut landed for the year. The third column shows the 
59. By "unregulated," I mean to say that there were no quantitative limitations 
on fishing. American and Canadian halibut markets remained relatively open to 
imports, and neither government were particularly inclined to exclude fishing boats 
from their neighboring country. Thus, although there were still regulatory 
requirements, they did not impose any limits on fishing. WILLIAM F. THOMPSON AND 
F. HEWARD BELL, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES COMMISSION NO. 5: 
BIOLOGICAL STATISTICS OF THE PACIFIC HALIBUT FISHERY 49-54 (1934), available 
online at http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/scientif.htm.
60. The 1924 treaty also limited halibut fishing to nine months of the year. 
However, since the bulk of the halibut fishing took place during these months 
anyway, the seasonal limitation had little effect. REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
FISHERIES COMMISSION, NUMBER 1 14 (1931), available online at 
http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/scientif.htm. 
61. WILLIAM F. THOMPSON AND F. HEWARD BELL, REPORT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES COMMISSION NO. 6: BIOLOGICAL STATISTICS OF THE 
PACIFIC HALIBUT FISHERY EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN INTENSITY UPON TOTAL YIELD 
AND YIELD PER UNIT OF GEAR 11 (1931), available online at 
http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/scientif.htm.
62. Id, at 13-14. Thompson and Bell concluded that "[t]he rise in catch per unit 
… is due in 1932 and 1933 to regulation, which has deliberately held the total catch 
at a level… WILLIAM F. THOMPSON AND F. HEWARD BELL, REPORT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES COMMISSION NO. 8: BIOLOGICAL STATISTICS OF THE 
PACIFIC HALIBUT FISHERY 23 (1931) available online at 
http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/scientif.htm.
63. Pacific halibut were divided into two distinct stocks, one that stayed 
generally south of Cape Spencer, near Juneau, and one that generally stayed west of 
Cape Spencer. Id. at 18-21. Statistics for the other stock yielded results very similar 
to the stock south of Cape Spencer. Id. at 12.
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total number of utilized "skates," groundfishing lines that have a fairly 
standardized number of hooks per unit of length.64 The fourth column 
shows the catch per skate, the measure of what is known in fisheries 
economics as "catch-per-unit-effort," a measure of fishing efficiency.
Table 4
Year Pounds landed
Number of 
Skates
Catch per 
Skate (lbs)
1910 51,849,240 191,325 271.0
1911 56,931,796 240,219 237.0
1912 60,379,550 343,066 176.0
1913 56,235,579 436,273 128.9
1914 45,276,669 364,840 124.1
1915 45,025,016 381,568 118.0
1916 30,218,908 263,690 114.6
1917 31,602,797 386,342 81.8
1918 27,070,659 309,379 87.5
1919 27,402,631 332,960 82.3
1920 33,158,192 394,271 84.1
1921 37,476,466 487,340 76.9
1922 31,294,067 499,915 62.6
1923 28,844,269 504,270 57.2
1924 27,004,148 483,945 55.8
1925 23,941,311 462,187 51.8
1926 25,790,876 494,078 52.2
1927 24,630,370 498,588 49.4
1928 27,209,093 569,228 47.8
1929 26,253,998 653,085 40.2
1930 22,598,895 643,843 35.1
1931 22,473,326 548,130 41.0
1932 22,881,718 456,721 50.1
1933 23,599,734 452,970 52.1
Source: William F. Thompson and F. Heward Bell, Report 
of the International Fisheries Commission No. 8: Biological 
Statistics of the Pacific Halibut Fishery, available online at 
http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/scientif.htm. 
64. Id at 21.
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Several interesting trends should be noted in table 4. First, with the 
exception of just a few years up to 1931, there was an increase in the 
number of skates each year, a measure of the amount of fishing effort 
expended each year. Second, with the exception of just three years 
before 1931, there was a decrease in fishing efficiency each year. 
Third, there was a general downward trend in the total amount of 
halibut landed. 
The lessons of the early twentieth-century halibut fishery are 
two-fold. Clearly, regulation was needed to save the resource. But just 
as importantly, regulation was needed to save the fishermen from 
themselves. As fishing efficiency spiraled steadily downward, 
fishermen were caught in a dynamic of having to fish just to salvage 
what they could from a depleted stock. Failure to fish, giving up on the 
race to fish, meant having their only valuable capital asset – their boat 
– sit idle. With many fishermen still paying off loans on their boats, 
idleness was not an option. 
The poverty trap that has engulfed many fishing communities 
is in fact what has motivated economists to study the open access 
fishing problem. As early as 1955, H. Scott Gordon derived the 
mechanism by which fishing communities invariably fished 
themselves into a bust cycle in which they discovered an abundant fish 
species, rushed in with too many boats, and wound up overfishing the 
stock to the brink of a collapse, the fish stocks utterly unable to 
provide fishing communities with sufficient income to fend of 
poverty.65
Regulation was thus needed not only to save the Pacific 
halibut, but to save the halibut fishing industry.66 This latter aspect is 
the one conveniently overlooked by categorical opponents of 
regulation. There is often the implicit assumption that any form of 
65. Gordon's theoretical findings find support from studies of the halibut case. 
See, e.g., WILLIAM F. THOMPSON AND F. HEWARD BELL, REPORT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES COMMISSION NO. 5: BIOLOGICAL STATISTICS OF THE 
PACIFIC HALIBUT FISHERY 10 (1931), available online at 
http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/scientif.htm ("The great effect of 
inconspicuous mechanical changes and of cheaper power explains on the one hand 
the present existence of the fishery despite a greatly lowered abundance, and on the 
other indicates … that the decline will be continued far beyond the limit which seems 
at present profitable." (emphasis added)).
66. For one of many accounts of how the failure to regulate resulted in the 
wreckage of the Eastern cod fishery, see MICHAEL HARRIS, LAMENT FOR AN OCEAN: 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE ATLANTIC COD FISHERY (1999).
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regulation is a subtraction from an individual right, and that it 
invariably diminishes the wealth or utility of the regulated 
individual.67 What this overlooks are the gains to be had from 
cooperation, and gains that can be created by institutions, 
governmental or otherwise, that facilitate and even mandate 
cooperation.
IV. The Campaign Finance Problem
A. Overfishing for Votes
Ubiquitous campaign advertisements in all kinds of media 
seem to have accomplished two things: numbing the voting electorate 
to campaign advertisements, and cultivating a concern over the role of 
money in political campaigns, particularly federal ones.68 The 
pervasive nature of campaign advertising has dulled voters' senses to 
the messages behind the advertising. One study reported that 
registered voters saw an average of almost eight campaign ads on TV 
per day during the 2002 Congressional campaign cycle.69 At the same 
time, the sheer volume of campaign advertising has made people 
wonder how it can be that candidates for political office can have such 
huge sums of money to spend on advertising. Ballooning campaign 
expenditures and an increasing amount of time and effort of politicians 
spend fundraising have fueled a suspicion money has gained more 
than just a toehold over political institutions and processes. Former 
Congressman Lee Hamilton, as director of the Center on Congress at 
Indiana University, has lamented this voter cynicism: 
67. Reagan administration Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldridge 
disapproved a plan to introduce individual transferable quotas to the beleaguered 
halibut fishery because it "ran counter to free market principles."  As aides 
explained, "[a]s an Administration, we're just opposed to limiting fishing to only 
those who have formerly fished... We are concerned that it would interfere with 
basic economic liberties." John Balzar, A Catch as Catch Can Fish Plan, L.A. Times, 
June 28, 1992, at A1.
68. States have not been spared from the cycle of campaign spending for state-
wide elections. The number of PACs in Virginia to address state elections has 
doubled in the last four years, reflecting the ballooning costs of seeking statewide 
elective office. R.H. Melton, Campaign Costs Soar, Prompting Va. Power PACs, 
WASHINGTON POST, June 2, 2003, at B1.
69. David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson, Campaign 2002: the Perfect Storm, 
Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, Brigham Young University.
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The rising flood of money that flows into campaigns 
also undermines general public trust in the political 
system. Many Americans feel it is the money, not ideas 
and not principles, that reigns supreme in our political 
system. I often heard people say that the political 
process was run by the moneyed interests, so they saw 
little reason to vote.70
This widespread suspicion only exacerbates the anesthetizing 
properties of campaign speech. A perception that a political candidate 
has been bought and paid for only dulls the viewer to the substantive 
aspects (if any) of campaign speech. A report by the Pew Center for 
the People and the Press found that while the 2000 presidential 
campaign was generally better in terms of information available, 
candidates’ commercials were considered less effective than they were 
in 1992.71 One might not be surprised that pundits are crying foul quite 
loudly,72 but not even critics of campaign finance reform proposals 
believe that the system we have for running political campaigns is 
adequate.73
Debates about the efficacy of and problems with campaign 
speech, however, are rarely followed by satisfying discussion of 
solutions. The greatest obstacle to solving the campaign finance 
problem is that almost any conceivable solution would somehow 
impinge upon Constitutionally-protected speech. And even campaign 
finance reform advocates seem willing to concede the notion put forth 
by Justice Holmes that more speech is always better. In Abrams v. 
70. Lee Hamilton, The Money Chase, The Center on Congress at Indiana 
University, available online at 
http://congress.indiana.edu/radio_commentaries/the_money_chase.php (last visited 
on January 17, 2005).
71. PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, CAMPAIGN 2000 
HIGHLY RATED (November 16, 2000), available online at http://people-
press.org/reports/print.php3?ReportID=23.
72. See, e.g., David S. Broder, Level the Presidential Playing Field, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 19, 2003, at B7; E.J. Dionne Jr., How to Fix Financing, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 28, 2003, at A41; Thomas Edsall & Dan Balz, Kerry to Forgo Public 
Campaign Financing; Democrat Says He Will Use His Own Money, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 16, 2003, at A12; Editorial, Your Turn; Fix the Finance Rules for Presidential 
Races; The Public-Financing Program for Presidential Candidates, Designed to 
Even the Playing Field, is Broken, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWs, Nov. 12, 2003, at 
6B.
73. BRADLEY SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH x (2001).
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U.S.,74 Holmes argued in dissent for a "free trade in ideas" and "that 
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted 
in the competition of the market…."75 This led to the popularization of 
the phrase "marketplace of ideas," coined by Justice Brennan76 to 
describe the notion that the best way to ascertain the truth is to have 
"uninhibited, robust and wide-open" discussion77 serve as an open 
competition of ideas. The freer the discussion, the more robust the 
competition, and the more certain the truth, would go the reasoning.
The battle over campaign finance reform has been waged with 
this truism in mind. The campaign finance problem is seen as a clash 
of the principles of equality and freedom of speech, with free 
campaign spending being equated with free speech.78 Reform 
advocates have argued that equality principles have become 
jeopardized, and that regulation is warranted to correct the heavy bias 
towards those interest groups that tend to be well-funded.79 Detractors 
of campaign finance reform, on the other hand, argue that given the 
necessarily clumsy and ultimately flawed ways of regulating campaign 
finance, it is better to stick with the principle that is easier to defend –
freedom of speech, and relative freedom to contribute to campaigns. 
Some reform advocates take their cue from Justice Stevens's 
dissent in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,80 and take issue 
with the notion that campaign finance is purely "speech." Their 
argument has been that campaign contributions implicate property 
interests, not speech interests.81 This view would presumably bifurcate 
the spending of money and the use of the money to purchase speech, 
as acts of separate legal import. For purposes of this Article, I put 
74. 250 U.S. 616 (1917).
75. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
76. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J. 
concurring).
77. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
78. MARTIN REDISH, MONEY TALK$ 136-39 (2001); BRADLEY A. SMITH, 
UNFREE SPEECH 12-13 (2001).
79. See, e.g., Yoav Dotan, Campaign Finance and the Social Inequality 
Paradox, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 955 (2004); Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz, 
The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed 
Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160 (1994); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-
Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204 
(1994).
80. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000).
81. Spencer A. Overton, Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property 
Characteristics of Political Money 53 VAND. L. REV. 1235 (2000); REDISH, supra, 
note 78, at 122-25.
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aside this objection to consider the impacts of the spending and the 
speech, taken together.
Neither reform advocates or detractors have examined the 
underlying premise of the free speech argument: that more speech is 
always better. "Better" in what sense? At the margins, more speech is 
always better for the speaker – no campaign ever makes a conscious 
decision to simply remove their candidate from the airwaves, 
newspapers, and billboards, or to unilaterally disarm. But it is 
becoming clear that at certain levels of campaign speech, it becomes 
so ubiquitous and so commodified that it loses its effectiveness.82
And yet, candidates for political and even judicial office face 
ever-increasing demands to engage in more and more campaign 
speech. This, in turn, has led to ever-increasing pressure to raise 
money, surely one of the most unpleasant tasks facing campaigners. 
Hubert Humphrey called it a "disgusting, degrading, demeaning 
experience."83 But raising large sums of money has become essential 
to seeking public office, and almost from the very moment that an 
election victory is secured, candidates must begin their new cycle 
anew, often raising money the morning after an election victory, 
giving rise to the coinage of the phrase "permanent campaign."84 This 
de facto obligation is very much contrary to the purpose of seeking 
elected office in the first place: to serve the public. Candidates 
routinely miss important activities such as floor votes on important 
legislation so that they can raise more money.85 A recent survey of 
82. It has become widely noted that trends seem to indicate a growing 
disillusionment on the part of the voting electorate with the political campaign 
process generally. Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons For Democracy: An 
Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 
1, 3-4 (1996).
83. Hamilton, supra, note 70.
84. See, e.g., NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN AND THOMAS E. MANN, THE PERMANENT 
CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTURE (2000); James A. Thurber, Is the Permanent Campaign 
Alive and Well After 9/11? Available online at 
http://www.american.edu/spa/ccps/pdffiles/permenent.pdf (last visited January 17, 
2005).
85. During the 2004 Presidential campaign cycle, Democratic Presidential 
Hopeful Dick Gephardt, for example, missed 85% of the House floor votes for the 
first part of 2003, and eventual nominee John Kerry missed over 50%. Juliet 
Eilperin, Gephardt, Kerry Miss the Most Hill Votes; Two Draw Focus of 
Republicans Tallying Absences of White House Hopefuls, WASH. POST, June 1, 
2003, at A04. Former Congressman Lee Hamilton, as Director of the Center on 
Congress at Indiana University, has lamented that the "money chase distorts the 
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2200 federal, state, and local candidates reported that more than half 
of those running for statewide office and 43 percent of those running 
for Congress spent at least one-quarter of their time raising money,86
while seventeen percent spent more than half their time raising 
money.87 Failure to keep pace with an opponent in fundraising allows 
the opponent to use airwaves to define the campaign, monopolize 
public attention, and worst of all, launch attacks that go unanswered. 
Therein is lies the paradox: candidates must raise more and more 
money to engage in more and more campaign speech, but are finding 
their speech increasingly ineffective in reaching the hearts and minds 
of voters. Voters put off by the barrage of campaign speech have 
responded by not voting. It is an arms race of campaign fundraising 
and spending.
There are strong parallels between the overfishing problem and 
the campaign finance problem that illustrate the dynamics of a tragedy 
of the commons. Both involve a rival resource. In the case of 
overfishing, the resource is obviously the fish stock, while in the 
campaign finance problem the resource is the ability of political 
candidates to reach the hearts and minds of voters that face competing 
demands on their time and attention. Both involve the degradation of 
this resource. In fishing, the fish stock deteriorates, while in the 
campaign finance context voter interest in campaign messages is lost. 
Both problems involve overexploitation of the resource. Just as 
fishermen take too many fish, political candidates go to the airwaves 
too often to try and get a message across to voters. Because more 
speech is always better from the viewpoint of an individual candidate, 
the incentive is for the candidate to speak until she has no more money 
left in her campaign coffers. In essence, the candidate is wasting the 
resource by using it too intensively and too often. 
In both situations, individual interests conflict with collective 
interests. In both situations, the rational course of action from the 
individual viewpoint is to continue to exploit and ruin the resource, 
because if any one individual refrains, it cannot count on other 
political process, crowding out other activities like writing laws, thinking about 
public policy, or meeting with ordinary voters…." Lee Hamilton, supra, note 70.
86. Peter L. Francia, Paul S. Herrnson, Begging for Buck – Campaign 
Fundraising, Campaigns & Elections, April 2001, available online at 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2519/is_2_22/ai_74410584 (last visited 
January 11, 2005).
87. Paul S. Herrnson, The Campaign Assessment and Candidate Outreach 
Project, 2000 Survey (Univ. of Maryland, 2000).
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individuals to also refrain. The result would be that while the resource 
is ruined, the refraining individual is the only one that does not enjoy 
the temporary benefit of the ruination of the resource. Campaigning 
politicians face this dilemma. There is no incentive to ever refrain 
from campaigning, or raising money to do it. While campaigning 
politicians spend less effectively the more they spend, abstention 
would still be tantamount to capitulation. 
Both problems are serious problems that may have profound 
long-term consequences. Once a fish species is overfished, it will take 
years for it to recover, if it even can recover. Slow-growing sea 
mammals such as whales may not ever recover from Norwegian and 
Japanese whaling practices.88 In political campaigns, once the 
electorate becomes sufficiently cynical and disillusioned by the 
methods of financing and prosecuting political campaigns, it may take 
a long time for voter interest and confidence to return.
Some observations can be made about the campaign speech 
effort that are similar to those made about fishing effort. Data on 
campaign spending and voter turnout in U.S. federal elections can be 
used to illustrate that campaign spending and spending effectiveness 
has followed a pattern similar to that of halibut fishing and fishing 
effort.
B. U.S. Data
As a proxy for campaign speech effort, I use total dollars spent 
in a federal campaign cycle on U.S. House of Representatives and 
U.S. Senate campaigns.89 There is certainly some inexactness of this 
measure, as there is with using skates to measure fishing effort. Some 
campaigns involve close races that draw more money than would 
otherwise be the case. Some campaigns, such as those conducted by 
independently wealthy candidates such as 1996 Senate candidate 
Michael Huffington and Senators Jon Corzine and Herb Kohl, draw 
88. Martha Mendoza, Fans Thrill to the Denizens of the Deep, L.A. TIMES, 
February 24, 2002 at B1. A moratorium on commercial whaling imposed by the 
International Whaling Commissions has been ignored by signatory states, including 
Japan and Norway, while they invoke its provisions to conduct "scientific research" 
on thousands of whales. Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global 
Governance, 22 MICH. J. INTL. L. 1, 57-62 (2000). Since the imposition of the ban in 
1986, Norway and Japan have killed approximately 18,000 whales.
89. I also analyzed data on campaign receipts, and the empirical findings did 
not change.
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upon huge private reserves of money. However, money remains a 
better proxy than any other conceivable measure of campaigning 
effort. Data on person-hours spent on the campaign trail, or on 
fundraising efforts, even if it existed, would be unreliable. 
Data on U.S. federal elections from 1976 to 2002 is used for 
analysis. This period is bookended by two major changes in the law on 
campaign finance: Buckley v. Valeo90 was decided in 1976, upholding 
most of the provisions of the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act 
("FECA"). Prior to 1974, no limits on direct contributions, or "hard 
money," were in effect, and FECA's limits on hard money were upheld 
in Buckley v. Valeo. In 2002, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
("BCRA"), or popularly known as McCain-Feingold (after the Senate 
sponsors), or Shays-Meehan (after the House sponsors) was passed 
and took effect on November 6, 2002, the day after Election Day.91
The BCRA was upheld in large part by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
McConnell v. FEC.92 The BCRA has many effects, but for our 
purposes the most important were to raise the direct contribution limit 
from $1,000 to $2,000,93 and to limit the use of soft money as a source 
of funding in campaigns.94 It would be inappropriate to compare 
expenditure data before and after BCRA, as direct contributions 
between $1,000 and $2,000 could skew the fundraising data, as could 
differences in PAC contributions. While the Federal Election 
Commission continued to make significant rulings during this period 
from 1978 to 2002, I assume that there were no changes to the legal 
environment with respect to campaign fundraising and spending that 
would bias results.
Presidential election years are different from midterm federal 
election years in both spending and voter turnout. Spending is clearly 
greater in Presidential years, but voter turnout is much greater in 
Presidential years. The result is that campaign spending efficiency –
measured in terms of votes per dollar spent – is invariably greater in 
Presidential years. For illustrative purposes, I thus divide the data into 
two sets, shown in Tables 5 and 6. 
90. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
91. BCRA, P.L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, § 402 (March 27, 2002).
92. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
93. BCRA § 307, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (2002).
94. BCRA § 307, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (2002), limiting the amount of 
money that can be contributed by "multicandidate political committees."
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Table 5 – Campaign Expenditures in U.S. House and Senate 
Campaigns, Presidential Election Years
Year Total dollars spent (2002 dollars)
Voter turnout 
(adjusted for 2002 
voter registration)
Votes per 
dollar spent
1976 $309,375,000 106,919,135 0.346
1980 $417,706,446 105,496,502 0.253
1984 $553,907,457 102,279,658 0.185
1988 $618,600,300   98,956,292 0.160
1992 $637,897,436 105,649,989 0.166
1996 $715,896,552   96,857,224 0.135
2000 $886,197,917 104,300,496 0.118
Source: Federal Election Commission. http://www.fec.gov. 
Table 6 – Campaign Expenditures in U.S. House and Senate 
Campaigns, Midterm Election Years
Year Total dollars spent (2002 dollars)
Voter turnout 
(adjusted for 2002 
voter registration)
Votes per 
dollar spent
1978 $426,388,889 79,533,230 0.187
1982 $533,507,393 81,684,886 0.153
1986 $655,829,152 74,486,037 0.114
1990 $533,780,822 76,766,507 0.144
1994 $714,536,585 80,935,063 0.113
1998 $674,076,923 75,510,851 0.112
2002 $770,180,000 78,390,424 0.102
Source: Federal Election Commission. http://www.fec.gov. 
Two adjustments are made to the data: the Consumer Price Index95 is 
used to adjust dollar figures for inflation,96 and Census Bureau data is 
95. Available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/. 
96. Since the direct contribution limit under FECA remained at $1,000 for the 
entire period, and argument could be made that no adjustment for inflation should be 
made at all. Not adjusting for inflation would render the argument in this article 
stronger.
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used to adjust voter turnout data for growth in the voting-age 
population.97
To be sure, the nature of campaign spending changed 
dramatically during this period. To reach voters, politicians have used 
buttons, signposts, bumper stickers, radio and TV advertising, 
telephone solicitations, and internet advertising. This is no different 
from fishing, however; different fishing technologies have made 
fishing more efficient and more destructive over time. Similarly, TV 
and internet access have clearly been great technological advances, but 
overuse of these technologies for campaign advertising has similarly 
reduced their usefulness.
There are clearly similarities between this data and that shown 
in Table 6 for halibut fishing. When an adjustment is made to account 
for growth in the voting-age population, it is not clear that there is a 
downward trend in voter turnout over time, as there is in halibut 
landed. But there is in both data sets an observable upward trend in 
expenditures, and an observable downward trend in efficiency, as 
measured by catch per skate and by votes per dollar. The data from 
Tables 5 and 6 are set out in Figure 7, along with the data from Table 
4, containing data from halibut fishing discussed above, set out in 
Figure 8.
97. Estimates on the number of voting age Americans and data on voter 
registration data are from the Census Bureau.    
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/voting/tabA-1.xls
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Figure 7
Votes Per Dollar Spent
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Although the similar downward trends in campaign spending 
efficiency and fishing efficiency are obvious, there are a number of 
possible explanations for the downward trend in campaign expenditure 
efficiency other than the existence of an inexorable tragedy of the 
commons. Given the small number of observations, it is impossible to 
conclusively test hypotheses on the causes of decreasing campaign 
spending effectiveness. However, the data from Presidential-year and 
Midterm-year elections can be pooled using a dummy variable to 
capture the differential effects, and the resulting fourteen observations 
will permit us to at least entertain some suggestions. 
One alternative explanation is that increasing income has led to 
more disposable income that can be used to fund campaigns, leading 
to more money being pumped into the political campaign effort. If this 
were true, then there is no market failure because increased campaign 
spending is simply a reflection of this particular effect of greater 
disposable income. 
Another alternative explanation is that increased campaign 
spending is simply due to increased advertising expenditures. It could 
be that political candidates are simply spending more money because 
it takes more to compete with potato chip commercials or automobile 
commercials. This does not, however, necessarily preclude a tragedy 
of the commons explanation; it may simply reflect the possibility that 
campaign speech and advertising are all caught up in a tragedy of the 
commons.
Another possible alternative is that increased competitiveness 
of certain races has accentuated the important of these races, and led to 
an infusion of money into these races. However, the available 
evidence suggests that federal campaigns have become less 
competitive, not more. Incumbency re-election rates have been 
increasing for decades.98
Another possible alternative explanation is that voters have 
been turned off by a number of factors other than campaign spending. 
One might argue, for example, that political partisanship has turned off 
98. Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad Alexander and Matthew Gunning, Incumbency, 
Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition for U.S. House Elections, working 
paper, Department of Political Science, Emory University (2004), available online at 
http://www.emergingdemocraticmajorityweblog.com/spsa/spsa.html (last visited 
January 29, 2005); Smith, supra, note 73, at 36-37; PAUL S. HERRNSON, 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME AND IN WASHINGTON 28-34 
(2004); John A. Ferejohn, On the Decline of Competition in Congressional 
Elections, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 166, 166 (1977).
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voters, and caused them to turn out in lower numbers.  This also runs 
counter to the evidence available, as political party identity seems to 
be on the decline.99 If one takes party loyalty as a measure of 
partisanship, then, one can say that partisanship has been decreasing, 
not increasing, over time.
Professor John Lott has empirically tested the hypothesis that 
the growth in the size of government has accounted for the growth in 
the amount of campaign spending.100 This hypothesis is not 
inconsistent with the hypothesis advanced in this Article. To the extent 
that Lott is claiming that there are increasing favors to be gotten from 
helping to fund elections, and that this has led to increasing attempts to 
curry favor with aspiring politicians, it is only natural that voters 
would be disillusioned with the degree of campaign spending, 
recognizing it for what it is: a symptom of the growing influence of 
money over political institutions. Lott's prescription, to shrink the size 
of government, is not necessarily inconsistent with prescriptions for 
solving the tragedy of campaign spending commons, though Lott is 
clear in his conviction that any other prescription would merely be 
addressing symptoms and not root causes.101 The suggestive findings 
in this Article are not inconsistent with Lott's.
A test for the effect of a tragedy of the commons can be 
accomplished by regressing the reciprocal of campaign spending 
efficiency – dollar spent per vote for U.S. House and Senate 
campaigns – against a simple time trend variable, the election year. 
The general form of the model estimated is
Campaign Expenditures/Votesi = 0 + 1 PresDummy + 2Yeari +
2 ln GDPi + 
3 ln Ad Expendituresi + i
The dependent variable is thus the reciprocal of the campaign 
spending efficiency. PresDummy is a dummy variable indicating an 
election taking place in a presidential election year. GDP is per capita 
99. Russell J. Dalton, The Decline of Party Identifications in PARTIES WITHOUT 
PARTISANS: POLITICAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES (Russell 
J. Dalton, Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., 2000).
100. John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures 
Are Increasing: the Government is Getting Bigger, 43 J. L. & ECON.359 (2000).
101. Lott, supra, note 100, at 360. Lott warns that attempting to restrict 
contributions would simply force would-be contributors to substitute in-kind 
contributions for monetary donations. Id, at 362.
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income, in 2000 dollars,102 and Ad Expenditures is the total amount of 
money spent nationally on advertising, also adjusted for inflation.103 I 
use the natural logarithm for these two variables.104 A positive 
coefficient on the year variable thus represents the decreasing
effectiveness, over time, of campaign spending. Results are shown in 
Table 7 below. 
Table 7
(n=14;  t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent variable: Campaign Expenditures / Vote
Model 1
Year only
Model 2
Advertising 
only
Model 3
GDP only
Model 4
All
R2 0.90 0.93 0.89 0.96
Adjusted
R2 0.88 0.92 0.87 0.94
Intercept -369.6(-7.90)
-61.8
(-8.92)
-86.9
(-7.20)
-422.4
(-2.26)
Presidential
Election
Dummy
-1.73
(-4.57)
-1.78
(-5.73)
-1.77
(-4.56)
-1.76
(-6.42)
Year 0.190(8.07)
0.250
(2.04)
ln Ad
Expend
5.77
(10.06)
10.84
(3.45)
ln GDP 9.27(7.85)
-20.96
(-2.30)
102. GDP data is obtained from a website provided by Economic History 
Services: http://www.eh.net/hmit/gdp/ (last visited January 30, 2005).
103. National advertising data is obtained from Bob Coen's Insider Report, 
archived at http://www.universalmccann.com/ourview.html (last visited January 12, 
2005).
104. A Box-Cox test indicated that a linear model might also provide a fit, but 
empirically, the log-linear models provided slightly more predictive models.
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With just 14 observations, these results can only be considered 
suggestive. But the signs of coefficients rarely switch, and the 
coefficient for the dummy for Presidential Election Years is very 
consistent. These results point us towards some interesting inferences. 
First, the time trend variable is positive and significant, and the 
coefficients of similar magnitude in both models 1 and 4, indicating 
that we may at least entertain the suggestion that declining efficiency 
over time is indicative of a tragedy of the commons pattern of 
campaign fundraising and spending. Second, the best explanatory 
variable is ln Ad Expenditures. Does this suggest that campaign 
spending has been increasing only because general advertising 
expenditures are increasing? This is possible, but if true, this would 
not render less plausible the hypothesis that campaign spending 
efficiency is a tragedy of the commons. It would entirely consistent to 
offer a complementary hypothesis: that advertising spending in general 
follows a tragedy of the commons pattern. However, because private 
rents from advertising are so high, this is likely to be tolerated for a 
longer time by private advertising spenders. 
It is interesting to compare these results with those obtained by 
Lott. Using a slightly different specification, Lott found a highly 
significant relationship between campaign spending and government 
size, but Lott's regressions also found a significant time trend 
relationship.105 Since Lott's was simply trying to control for time-
sensitive effects, he did not comment on the significance of his time 
trend variable.
I am not prepared to make the strong claim that I have proven 
that the tragedy of the commons fully explains spiraling campaign 
spending. Strictly speaking, this latter proposition would be difficult to 
conclusively prove, requiring the rejection of all other possible and 
incompatible explanations. However, the combination of anecdotal 
evidence and the statistical inferences in this case should give us 
reason to consider the possibility carefully. Does a tragedy of the 
commons explanation seem more or less likely than the alternative 
explanations? Does it ring true that we are pouring money into 
campaigns, and candidates are pouring effort into fundraising and 
spending, because we are simply wealthier, and can afford it? Perhaps 
spiraling advertising costs are to blame, possibly its own tragedy of the 
commons that has spilled over into the political arena. But in all of the 
105. Lott, supra, note 100, at 383.
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hand-wringing by politicians and by pundits and concerned citizen 
groups over campaign spending, not one, to my knowledge, invokes 
increased advertising expenses as the root cause of spiraling campaign 
spending. 
Future research may involve data in which the time trends in 
GDP data or advertising data can be separated out. In the meantime, 
we should be willing to acknowledge that perhaps, we are facing too 
much campaign speech and too much campaign spending, and that it 
does our political candidates no good to give them unfettered rights to 
raise money and spend it.
C. Is U.S. Campaign Spending "Excessive"?
I do not make the claim that campaign spending is inefficiently 
high due to a tragedy of the commons dynamic, such that we have 
reached the equivalent of rent dissipation. More evidence is needed 
before this strong claim is made. Indeed, most scholars in the field of 
campaign finance balk at the suggestion that campaign spending and 
concomitant campaign advertising is in any sense of the word 
"excessive." The problem with campaign spending, as Professors 
Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres have argued, is that most campaigns 
are underfinanced, and not overfinanced.106 As Ackerman and Ayres 
note, campaign expenditures for the 2000 election cycle totaled $3 
billion, while automobile advertisement expenditures totaled $13 
billion, and total TV advertising expenditures totaled $66 billion.107
Critics of campaign finance reform, of course, chime in with more 
examples of expenditures on trivial goods and how they dwarf 
political campaign expenditures.108
In terms of raw spending amounts, perhaps $3 billion is too 
small a sum to be spending on a matter far more important than the 
type of automobiles we buy, or the sum total of all the other fairly 
106. BRUCE ACKERMAN AND IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE PARADIGM 85 (2002) (citing a study by fourteen campaign 
finance experts that the problem is "not too much spending, but too little…"  See 
also, CAMPAIGN REFORM: INSIGHTS AND EVIDENCE, REPORT ON THE TASK FORCE ON 
CAMPAIGN REFORM, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (2002), available online at 
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~lbartels/campaignreform/; Richard Briffault, 
Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: A Review of Voting With Dollars, 91 Cal. L. 
Rev. 643, 657-48 (2003).
107. Id.
108. Bradley Smith notes that Americans spend two to three times more on 
potato chips than on political campaigns. Smith, supra, note 73, at 35.
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trivial consumer expenditure decisions we make that bring on the 
spending of $66 billion advertising per year. However, the conclusion 
must be more nuanced than that. Ackerman and Ayres fully recognize 
that the problem is the taint of the money that is used to fund these 
campaign expenditures – hence their ingenious proposal to establish a 
secret donation booth for campaign donations.109 Thus, in the overall 
sense, campaign spending is too small a part of our budget. This is 
why Ackerman and Ayres's proposal to subsidize campaign spending 
makes sense. More spending on campaign speech is not necessarily a 
bad, provided that it is funded by the right type of sources. However, 
the amount of campaign speech and spending of the nature currently 
predominant is not a good or effective thing, precisely for the reasons 
that Ackerman and Ayres and others have recognized: the lack of 
credibility associated with campaign speech that seems too closely tied 
to unseemly regulated interests. A reform critic, FEC Chairman 
Bradley Smith, has allied himself with the John Lott argument: that 
campaign expenditures are rising because of the growth of 
government, federal and state.110 But this seems to concede that voters 
view money as a corrupting influence, since this causal relationship 
implies a quid pro quo in large campaign contributions by large 
donors. 
An economic analysis illustrates this point. Ackerman and 
Ayres lament that campaign spending is less than one-fourth of 
spending on automobile advertisements. This is exactly what we 
would expect, however. Automobile advertising is a private good, as 
opposed to the public good of campaign speech; at least that's what the 
pretense is. Assuming that auto advertising and the campaign 
advertising expenditures can be modeled as declining-marginal benefit 
enterprises with constant marginal costs (as Gordon modeled 
overfishing111) a comparison of the two markets reveals that the higher 
marginal and average products of auto advertising, owing to the 
private nature of its rents, is higher than that of campaign advertising. 
This is show in Figure 9.
109. Supra, note 106, at 25-44, 93-110.
110. Smith, supra, note 73, at 35.
111. See text accompanying figure 5, infra.
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Figure 9
We expect auto advertisements to be more frequent, because 
we expect auto manufacturers to appropriate the rents from auto 
advertising. However, an idealistic voter does not expect campaign 
advertising to be very high, because she does not expect that campaign 
advertising yields a result that inures to the private benefit of the 
campaigning politician – unless, of course, there are quid pro quos 
involved with the campaign donations,112 in which case we expect the 
level of campaign spending to rise, concomitant with the higher 
average and marginal product of campaign advertising. Marginal and 
average products of advertising are no longer low, because there is a 
generous private benefit that inures to the campaigning politician – a 
112. Much has been written on whether there is a causal connection between 
political contributions and voting patterns of recipients. See, e.g., Stephen G. 
Bronars and John R. Lott, Jr., Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician 
Votes?  40 J. LAW & ECON. 317 (1997); Thomas Stratmann, What Do Campaign 
Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes, 57 S. ECON. J. 
606 (1991); Thomas Stratmann, Are Contributors Rational? Untangling Strategies 
of Political Action Committees, 100 J. Pol. Econ. 647 (1992); Henry W. Chappell, 
Jr., Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-
Tobit Model, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 77 (1982); W.P. Welch, Campaign 
Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money and Dairy Price Supports, 35 
WESTERN POL. SCI. QUARTERLY 478 (1982). Suffice it say, however, the perception
that there is a quid pro quo is harmful enough to the electoral process.
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secure job113 of relative wealth and power in the United States 
Congress. The higher level of campaign advertising is thus a signal to 
the voter that average productivity of campaign dollars has increased, 
and that unsavory, if perfectly legal, funding sources are involved. 
The Ackerman and Ayres proposal to attempt to infuse 
campaign speech with more frequent speech, more meaningful speech, 
and less cynical perceptions on the part of voters is an ingenious one. 
Like most public funding proposals, they attempt to infuse campaign 
dollars into those campaigns that need and deserve it the most – those 
meritorious yet underfunded candidates that face a political machine 
with generous private funding sources that benefit from the 
incumbent's power. But by providing some free "Patriot" dollars to 
such candidates, the Ackerman/Ayres proposal not only funnels some 
money to the underdog, but also confers upon voters some expressive 
power by virtue of their being able to designate recipients for their 
Patriot dollars. At the same time, it raises the bar for private giving to 
incumbents with less-than-noble motivations for seeking and 
maintaining public office. The dual effects of this proposal are to 
subsidize those for whom campaign spending tends to be too low, and 
discourage giving to those for whom campaign spending tends to be 
too lavish, flattening differences in spending between well-endowed 
and poorly-endowed candidates. A graphical illustration is provided in 
Figure 10. The higher average product (AP) for the favorite reflects 
the greater private returns from campaign spending, in the form of job 
security in politics, and also perhaps a payback position upon 
retirement.114 The higher MC for money raised privately beyond the 
Patriot dollars (for which the MC is zero) represents the greater 
difficulty of raising this money, since donors will be more reluctant to 
contribute when it comes on top of the large base of Patriot dollars. 
Note the gap in campaign spending, between qunder and qfav, is 
113. Incumbency rates have been increasing for decades. Various explanations 
are offered for various periods. Bradley Smith argues that campaign finance 
limitations have disadvantaged challengers. See, e.g., Smith, supra, note 73, at 34-36. 
Numerous theories pertaining to redistricting activities have been put forth. See, e.g., 
Andrew Gelman and Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative 
Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541 (1994); Abramowitz, et al., supra, note 98. 
Also see other citations at note 98, supra.
114. Billy Tauzin retired in 2004 after twelve terms as a Congressman to head up 
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, a drug industry trade 
group, a position for which he will receive a $2 million salary. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 
Washington Talk; Lawmaker's Plans to Lobby Raises Issue of Crossing Line, N.Y. 
TIMES, February 7, 2004, at A12.
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relatively small, indicating the greater parity of spending power among 
competitors in this scheme. In the meantime, the speech becomes more 
credible, being provided in large part by Patriot dollars instead of 
private donations for which some political favor is expected.
Figure 10
However, all this is not to say that campaign spending is too 
low and thus not tragedy of the commons. Rather, it is an 
acknowledgement that some form of public funding of political 
campaigns would serve to improve the efficiency of campaign dollars 
spent. That is, it could be that campaign speech is only excessive 
because it is perceived by the voter to be tainted. The presence of the 
taint is what renders current levels of campaign speech excessive. 
Indeed, it is possible (though admittedly unlikely) that we would find, 
contrary to Ackerman and Ayres's suspicions, that less money is 
required to launch an effective campaign once the taint of money is 
removed. Ackerman and Ayres's proposal, to remove the taint by way 
of a form of public financing – a form that engages the public by 
involving it with distributional decisions – is thus aimed at flipping the 
campaign speech world from the incredible to the credible, but it does 
not necessarily relieve the candidates and the public from the 
inexorable push to engage in a fundraising and spending derby.
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V. Why Don't Resource Users Want to Be Saved From 
Themselves?
The most interesting question raised by true tragedies of the 
commons is why it has proven so difficult to save resource users from 
their own self-destructive behavior. If resource users benefit from 
limits on their own behavior, why don't resource users demand
regulation? In some instances, they do. In The Theory of Economic 
Regulation,115 Stigler illustrated how some regulated industries came 
about by the co-option of government by industries seeking protection 
from new entry and competition. A less cynical view of Stigler's 
theory might be that resource users sought the government's 
"coercive"116 powers to arrest wasteful over-exploitation. In other 
instances, even in the absence of governmental regulation, resource 
users coordinate behavior to avoid wasteful overexploitation, as 
studied by Elinor Ostrom's and others.117 But the reality of tragedies of 
the commons is such that most often, tragedies of the commons are not 
solved, despite the obvious and sometimes huge gains to be had. 
Economists have some difficulty explaining the persistence of 
tragedies of the commons that remain unsolved by coordination or 
regulation. Explaining this persistence seems to require some 
relaxation of assumptions of rationality, and some concessions to 
behavioral economists. Professor Barton Thompson has applied some 
of the behavioral economics literature to environmental tragedies of 
the commons, most notably overfishing and groundwater 
overdrafting.118 Thompson has attempted to explain why so many 
environmental tragedies of the commons have remained unresolved, 
and why, given the tremendous potential gains, we do not see more co-
operation or regulation.119 Much of the answer, Thompson finds, is 
that resource users harbor a variety of what can best be described as 
pathologies that cause them to oppose any sort of co-operative or 
regulatory arrangement that would extricate them from their particular 
tragedy. Roughly, the pathologies fall into three categories: the 
115. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. 
& MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
116. Stigler's view of government and rent-seeking by regulated industries was 
based upon the one thing government can offer industries: its "power to coerce." Id. 
at 4.
117. Supra, note 2. 
118. Supra, note 27.
119. Supra, note 27.
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difficulty of giving up perceived rights, self-serving notions of 
fairness, and undue optimism. 
In the case of fisheries, fishermen, like most other people, are 
inherently skeptical when asked to surrender a current right in 
exchange for a future benefit, even if the potential upside is very 
great.120 Thus, curtailing fishing effort, even if the benefit is a healthier 
stock to fish in the future, is viewed as a sacrifice even if the net result 
is a gain. It could be, as Thompson argues, that people simply frame 
gains and losses differently, discounting future gains relative to current 
losses.121 Or it could be that an "endowment effect"122 causes people 
hold onto their perceived entitlements with irrational stubbornness. 
Transportation planners would sympathize. In solving traffic problems 
they must deal with drivers who want traffic problems solved without 
their giving up their right to drive. There is a reason that the most 
popular solutions involve more government provisions, such as more 
roads or more subsidization of transit services, and rarely impose any 
costs upon drivers.123 One study found that some drivers even resent 
high-occupancy vehicle lanes as "special treatment" for other drivers, 
failing to recognize that they could pick up a passenger and become 
eligible themselves.124
Second, fixing resource and environmental problems often 
requires an allocation of burdens, a task that engenders self-serving 
"egocentric interpretations of fairness," that inhibit agreements that 
must be made before getting to the solutions.125 Cooperation to solve 
even the most pressing problems is elusive. Canada's Pacific halibut 
fishery provides a case in point. The fishery had become overfished as 
early as 1980, giving rise to economist Peter Pearse's prescription of 
adopting an individual transferable quota program to curb 
overfishing.126 The fishermen themselves recognized the need to adopt 
120. Supra, note 27, at 252-65.
121. Supra, note 27, at 262-65.
122. The "endowment effect" is the propensity for people to hold onto that 
which they already have, and to value it more than if they had to engage in a 
transaction to acquire it. Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer 
Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980).
123. Legislatures have typically indulged constituents by offering tax incentives 
rather than taxes to curb externality-imposing activities like driving. Maureen B. 
Cavanaugh,  On the Road to Incoherence¸ 49 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 685, 687-690 (2002).
124. Strahilevitz, supra, note 43, at 1239.
125. Supra, note 27, at 260-62.
126. PETER H. PEARSE, TURNING THE TIDE, A NEW POLICY FOR CANADA'S 
PACIFIC FISHERIES, B.C. Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 1982. Individual 
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an individual transferable quota program, but could not agree on an 
initial allocation of the quota.127 Only a sharply-worded ultimatum by 
the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans (who would have jurisdiction 
over the program) brought the fishermen back to the bargaining table, 
from which they eventually emerged with an agreement on how to 
allocate the quota.128
The human propensity to blame also plays into this pathology 
and plays a role in preventing cooperation from taking place. Fishing 
industries and fishing communities have trouble refraining from 
overfishing and have trouble agreeing to a cooperative solution 
because they remain fixated on the role that others have had in 
contributing the problem.129 Even if cooperation and sacrifice are in 
the best interests of the resource users, it has often proven to be too 
galling to undertake if they harbor a perception, right or not, that 
someone else's behavior was to blame for the problem in the first 
place.130
Finally, resource users deal with scientific uncertainty in ways 
that are not conducive to conservation or co-operation. People tend to 
adopt the most optimistic projections of resource stocks.131 People 
assume that they will find a way to make things work out, or that there 
will ultimately be some sort of government bailout.132 In the case of 
fishermen, regulation is often resisted because they cherish the 
opportunity to compete against each other,133 many of them because 
they harbor an elevated perception of the fishing skills vis-à-vis other 
fishermen.134 In short, uncertainty is almost never resolved in such a 
way that invites co-operation or regulation.
quota programs regulate fishing by licensing fishing to a specified quantity per 
quota. The quantity-based license cures the incentive to overfish in order to 
maximize profits, and the transferability provides an incentive for less efficient 
fishermen to exit the fishery, alleviating the overcapitalization problem. See, e.g., 
Shi-Ling Hsu & James Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the 1996 Sustainable 
Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799, 801-03 (1997).
127. SUZANNE IUDICELLO, FISH, MARKETS, AND FISHERMEN: THE ECONOMICS 
OF OVERFISHING 149 (1999).
128. Id.
129. Supra, note 27, at 261.
130. Supra, note 27, at 261-62.
131. Supra, note 27, at 262-65.
132. Id.
133. Supra, note 27, at 244-45.
134. Supra, note 27, at 244.
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All of these propensities are, in some sense, pathological. But 
for even the casual observer of human nature, these explanations of 
why people ignore their own long-term interests ring remarkably true. 
People very often very strongly prefer the broken system they know to 
the quite possibly superior system they do not know, even if they 
recognize that they are trapped in a tragic spiral.
Campaign finance and spending reform have been hostage to 
the same fears of the unknown. Opposition to the BCRA came from 
the AFL-CIO,135 the American Civil Liberties Union, the National 
Right to Life Committee, the Christian Coalition, the American Heart 
Association, and various chambers of commerce, to name just a few of 
the strange bedfellows.136 Congressional campaigners, presumably the 
beneficiaries of regulation that would limit the amount of fundraising 
they would have to do, have themselves been extremely critical of 
election financing.137 Rep. Albert R. Wynn (D-MD), an African-
American, opposed the BCRA because he believed that the soft money 
ban would impair the ability of black candidates and elected black 
representatives to fund get-out-the-vote drives and voter registration 
activities;138 this, despite the obvious reality that the overwhelming 
majority of soft money is contributed by regulated industries to further 
their economic interests, and confer substantially more advantages to 
white candidates than black.139 On the other side of the aisle, 
Republicans opposed the bill because of its lack of prohibitions on 
labor union activity in soliciting soft money for party activities;140 this 
despite the widely-held belief that a ban on soft money would amplify 
their advantage in hard money donations over the Democrats.141 At 
every turn, opposition to the BCRA has come from those with worst-
case suspicions of how the legislation would work to their detriment.
135. William O'Rourke, Editorial: Grieving Democrats Quietly Fade Into 
Insignificance, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, March 27, 2001, at 33.
136. Vanessa Blum, Senate Showdown: Battle Shifts on Finance Reform, LEGAL 
TIMES, March 19, 2001 at 1.
137. PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME 
AND IN WASHINGTON 284 (2004).
138. American Political Network: the Hotline, Vol. 10, No. 9, National Briefing 
Campaign Finance Reform: Does CBC Hold Keys in the House? April 9, 2001.
139. Herrnson, supra, note 137, at __.
140. Robert Braile, Of Politics and Money: a Man Recalls the Promise of a 
Handshake, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7, 1996, at 1.
141. Thomas Edsall, Campaign-reform Law Favors Republican Fund-raising 
Style, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, February 8, 2004, at 5. 
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And yet, some have recognized the need for mutual coercion. 
Former Senator Zell Miller wrote in an op-ed about his support for the 
BCRA:
Make no mistake about it: When it comes to winning 
political races by raising millions of dollars and buying 
lots of TV time, I'm as competitive as they come. I've 
done it three times in a row now – once for the Senate 
and twice for governor – and it's the formula for 
success in politics today. But frankly, it's a rotten 
formula, and the rules of this game need to change.… 
Yes, I know how to play that fundraising game with the 
best of them. Only today, I don't sleep nearly as well as 
I did years ago in those cheap motel rooms or on 
supporters' sofas.142
Implicit in Miller's op-ed is the recognition that, on some level, he 
enjoys the competitive aspect of raising and spending money. Like 
fishermen, politicians do not like to admit, publicly or to themselves, 
that they would like to be restrained from competing against each 
other in a game of skill, energy, and aggression, even if it detracts 
from the more important business of legislating and governing. 
Politicians labor under the same self-serving and self-congratulatory 
myths that fishermen do. And yet, at the end of the day, both 
politicians and fishermen understand on some level that the rat race 
just gets worse and worse.
In the end, of course, the BCRA passed both the House and 
Senate and the President signed it into law on March 27, 2002. In 
some ways, it was surprising that it took as much effort to pass it as it 
did – clearly the public perceived that campaign spending, especially 
that procured from soft money – was a corrupting influence.143
Campaign finance reform generally receives strong public support,144
and the BCRA, as a flashpoint for the issue, enjoyed particularly 
142. Zell Miller, A Sorry Way to Win, WASH. POST, February 25, 2001, at B7.
143. Nathaniel Persily and Kelli Lammie, Perception of Corruption and 
Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 3, 13-14, 
19-25, unpublished manuscript, University of Pennsylvania Law School, available 
online at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=upenn/wps. 
144. Id., at 13.
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strong support.145 Even if Congressional opponents of BCRA really 
believed that this would not ultimately solve the problem of tainted 
soft money, why would they be so reluctant to adopt something their 
constituents so strongly favor?
VI. Solving Tragedies of the Commons Problems
What, then, is to be done about these true tragedies of the 
commons that are at the heart of Hardin's contribution? What we have 
learned from the fishing problem is that it is very difficult to control 
the overexploitive behavior without addressing the incentives to race. 
Fishing regulations governing the use of destructive fishing 
technologies have been fraught with enforcement problems or been 
met with technological substitutions that have foiled the conservation 
purposes behind the regulations. For example, restrictions on boat 
lengths were met with the entry of rounder and more powerful 
boats,146 while regulations on line lengths were met with lines with 
more hooks.147 Regulations requiring fishing nets to be of a minimum 
mesh size (to allow small fish to escape) were met with the practice of 
intertwining nets to reduce the mesh size.148 Seasonal restrictions have 
only increased the pressure to engage in a short but increasingly 
intense fishing season. The Alaskan halibut fishery was reduced to a 
two-day season composed of two 24-hour fishing seasons, and the 
Canadian Pacific halibut fishery was reduced to a six-day season. 
These absurdly short seasons were simply derbies in which fishermen 
caught as much halibut as possible, paying no regard to ecological 
waste or human safety.149 The problem is that none of these solutions 
145. Public opinion polls vary in quality and results, but almost all every stage 
showed support for the McCain-Feingold legislation. The advocacy group Public 
Campaign commissioned a reputable polling group, the Mellman Group, to conduct 
eight statewide polls on support for the bill, and found support ranging from 58 to 75 
percent in favor. http://www.commondreams.org/pressreleases/jan99/011999e.htm
(last visited January 31, 2005).
146. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING THE FISH: TOWARD A NATIONAL 
POLICY ON INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS 175-76 (1999).
147. IUDICELLO, supra, note 127, at 81.
148. IUDICELLO, supra, note 127, at 81.
149. In derby fisheries such as the Canadian Pacific halibut fishery and the 
Alaskan halibut fishery before the advent of quotas systems, fishermen routinely 
worked around the clock, elevating risk of injury, while hauling in massive 
quantities of bycatch – fish species other than halibut incidentally caught – and 
wastefully discarding them. Derby fishing also leaves behind a trail of discarded 
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change the incentive to cheat. Making it more difficult to fish does not 
change the fundamental tragedy of the commons dynamics – the race 
to overexploit a rivalrous resource, and grab as much as possible while 
the resource still exists. Indeed, many of these regulatory courses 
exacerbate the incentives to cheat, overfish, and engage in a race to do 
so. Of course, sometimes a property rights-based solution is also 
unworkable – enforcement and monitoring problems must be solved 
no matter what the regulatory regime. But the essential failure of 
regulators in addressing tragedies of the commons is the failure to 
recognize and address the incentives to race to exploit a finite resource 
that is rivalrous in consumption. 
Like Ackerman and Ayres, I applaud the BCRA because it 
attempts the difficult task of trying to control excessive campaign 
behavior rather than throwing up one's hands and declaring defeat.150
And the Ackerman and Ayres proposal, a public financing proposal 
that confers, rather than detracts from fundamental liberties is a salve 
that could buy some valuable time in terms of removing the taint of 
campaign money, making political speech more temporarily more 
credible. But in the end, neither of these schemes addresses the 
incentives of politicians to race to raise money, to try and best one 
another even in a game that is "disgusting, degrading, and 
demeaning." In the end, neither would save the voting public from a 
world congested with campaign speech. Even "clean" money, if it 
buys too much speech, will dull the voters' overloaded senses. If in 
fact, we are witnessing a tragedy of the commons in campaign 
spending, then arresting it will require more than the BCRA and more 
than what Ackerman and Ayres propose.  It will require limitations on 
the quantity of campaign spending.
The argument that we might regulate campaign speech is not a 
radical or new one. Cass Sunstein argued in Democracy and the 
Problem of Free Speech that the distinction between campaign 
contributions and campaign expenditures has turned out to be 
somewhat illusory.151 Moreover, because of the rise of political action 
committees, the limit on contributions has actually exacerbated some 
of the problems of corruption and taint that the limit was meant to 
hooks, lines and nets that continue to "ghost fish" by snarling fish outside of any 
fishing effort at all. IUDICELLO, supra, note 127, at 136-37; Charles Birkeland, 
Ratcheting Down the Coral Reefs, 54 BIOSCIENCE 1021, 1021 (2004).
150. Ackerman and Ayres, supra, note 106, at 177-78.
151. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 94-
101 (1995).
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solve.152 Indeed, Sunstein argues that these scheme of half-hearted 
regulation is no less a regulatory system than one that might involve 
considerably more government involvement, and that replacing it is 
not necessarily unconstitutional.153 More generally, there are those that 
are concerned with economic power being perpetuated or even 
amplified by means of protecting free speech rights that, as a practical 
matter, can only be purchased through large sums of money.154 But 
while these measures have heretofore been justified on the grounds 
that a new balance must be struck, my argument is different. My 
argument is that no balancing is necessary, as intervention could be 
beneficial to those that would be regulated.
Exactly what form of campaign expenditure limits might be 
needed to truly solve the tragedy of the commons in campaign finance 
and spending problem is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it 
say, however, curtailing the incentives to race and overadvertise would 
almost certainly involve curtailing the quantity of direct appeals from 
political candidates through controlling their spending. The 
overabundance of campaign speech, after all, is what causes us voters 
to tune out. Perhaps this must be coupled with some form of public 
financing, as many have suggested,155 to ensure that we are still 
attempting to enhance speech and not merely quash it. But limiting 
candidate access to the public merits a serious discussion when we 
already tolerate a number of abridgements, including those set out in 
the BCRA.
Several U.S. states have enacted various forms of spending and 
contribution limits.156 Canada has had federal campaign spending 
limitations in effect since 1974. The Election Expenses Act157 imposed 
spending limits on parties158 and individual candidates,159 provided 
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED (1996).
155. See, e.g., supra, note 79. 
156. For a discussion of several of the state initiatives, see Maeghan Maloney 
and Michael Saxl, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: Unintended Consequences 
and the Maine Solution, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGISL. 465 (2004).
157. R.S.C. 1974.
158. Parties may only spend $0.70 for every eligible voter in the district. Canada 
Elections Act, c. 9, § 422(1) (S.C. 2000).
159. Candidates may only spend some calculated amount based upon the number 
of eligible voters in the district. Canada Elections Act, c. 9, §§ 440, 441(1) (S.C. 
2000).
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fairly generous federal subsidies for election expenses,160 and required 
broadcasters to make prime time air time available for registered 
political parties.161 Interestingly enough, at least one commentator has 
attributed the spending limits and electoral reforms to "an agreement 
to put an end to the upward spiral of election spending."162 The same 
commentator also noted that 
when combined with a reasonable level of public 
funding, spending limits reduce the pressure for parties 
and candidates to raise funds. This should not be 
interpreted to mean that parties face no such pressures. 
Rather, the pressure to raise money is reduced so that 
candidates do not find themselves devoting as 
significant a portion of their time to fundraising as do 
their American counterparts. By lessening the pressure 
to raise funds, spending limits are believed to reduce 
the temptation for parties and candidates to offer a 
quid-pro-quo for large contributions. Of course, such 
unsavory practices do occur from time to time, but the 
combination of spending limits and public funding in 
all probability reduces the frequency of such 
incidents.163
Is Canada such an awful example of electoral politics? The 
parliamentary system of government poses different challenges than 
does the American system, but surely this experience with spending 
limits is not such a failure that it is worth dismissing out of hand.
160. Parties may receive federal reimbursement for up to 50 percent of their 
election expenses provided they garner at least two percent of the valid votes case 
nationally, or a total of five percent of the valid votes in districts in which they ran 
candidates. Canada Elections Act, c. 9, § 435(1) (S.C. 2000). Candidates may 
receive up to 50 percent of their election expenses reimbursed provided they receive 
a minimum of some calculated percentage of votes. Canada Elections Act, c. 9, §§ 
464, 465 (S.C. 2000). Finally, political contributions are eligible for a tax credit 
worth up to a total credit of $500. Income Tax Act, c. 1, § 248 (R.S.C. 1985).
161. The Canada Elections Act requires radio and TV stations to provide free 
prime time air time advertising for registered parties. Canada Elections Act, c. 9, § 
345 (S.C. 2000).
162. Lisa Young, Regulating Campaign Finance in Canada: Strengths and 
Weaknesses, 3 ELECTION L.J. 444, 447 (2004)
163. Young, supra, note 162, at 450.
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Clearly, problems would remain were spending limitations to 
be adopted. The strongest criticism of campaign spending limits seems 
to be that any financial prohibitions will only result in like-kind 
behavior. Lott has argued that limits on contributions will give rise to 
like-kind donations.164 But is this always such a bad thing? Would it 
be such a disaster for democracy to have people donating, for 
example, their time rather than their money to a political campaign? 
One wonders if the distortions caused by attempts to regulate 
campaign speech would really be worse than the existing distortions. 
VI. Conclusion
This Article does not set forth a Constitutional justification for 
campaign fundraising limits or spending limits. But in the end, if the 
Constitutional value that we are protecting when we strike down these 
limits is that of freedom of speech, then we must confront threats to 
that freedom. This Article is meant to demonstrate that one threat to 
that freedom is the excessive exercise of that freedom itself. Well-
recognized intrusions upon the right to speak are based upon a 
recognition of competing interests. My proposed curtailment of speech 
is motivated by protection of the right to speak itself. While great care 
must be taken to design a regulatory scheme and implement rules that 
minimize perverse incentives, no balancing of interests is necessary.
It is curious, this dichotomy we draw between speech and 
property. Why does the Constitution treat property regulation and 
speech regulation differently?165 Is it because we believe property is 
scarce and speech is "free"?166 This is clearly not true in an 
information-overloaded modern society. I certainly do not advocate 
jurisprudentially collapsing speech and property, but it is worth 
bearing in mind property lessons as we think about campaign speech 
and speech generally. Just as the tragedy of the commons has taught us 
that in a property context we sometimes cannot trust people alone to 
order their affairs in a sensible way, we should now realize that some 
paternalism in the speech context may be necessary as well. Because 
political campaign speech is so important to a well-functioning 
democracy, it is all the more important that we consider bringing it 
164. Supra, note 100, at 362.
165. Overton, supra, note 81, at 1249-58.
166. Overton, supra, note 81, at 1249-58.
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into the regulatory realm, and not be left to chimerical free market 
ideals.
